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-IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

CERRITOS TRUCKING CO., et al.,
Plaintiffs
Respondents,
vs.
UTAH VENTURE NO. l, et al.,
Defendants
Appellants.

No.

17185

UTAH DEVELOPMENT COMPANY,
INC., et al. ,
Cross PlaintiffsAppellants,
vs.
BETTILYON REALTY COMPANY, et al.,
Cross DefendantsRespondents.

BRIEF OF CROSS DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT
BETTILYON REALTY
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The plaintiffs-respondents seek from the defendantsappellants damages and specific performance of an option to
purchase real property; the defendants-appellants seek
rescission of said option and, in the alternative, damages
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against plaintiffs-respondents and cross defendants-respondents
based upon misrepresentation and breach of fiduciary duty.

DISPOSITION OF THE CASE BY LOWER COURT

Following a trial by jury, the district court granted
directed verdicts in favor of the plaintiffs and cross
defendants and against the defendants, counterclaimants, and
cross claimants and entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

The cross defendant-respondent, Bettilyon Realty and
Investment Company, herein referred to as Bettilyon Realty
Company, seeks to sustain the directed verdict of the district
court.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The cross defendant-respondent, Bettilyon Realty,
agrees with the statement of facts as set forth as part of the
Statement of the Case Nith Citations to the Record in the brief
of the appellants and as modified and supplemented by the
Statement of the Case as set forth in the brief of the
plaintiffs-respondents and the cross defendant-respondent,
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Dunahoo, except with regard to those facts and circumstances as
are specifically considered below.
The appellant, William J. Lowenberg, is a real estate
broker, having been so licensed in the State of California for
some 30 years and with most of his experience being in the
development of his own properties.
Lowenberg).

(Tr. p. S2;

testimony of

He has had significant experience in development of

warehouses and industrial property in California prior to
venturing into the State of Utah (Tr. pp. S3, S4;
Lowenberg).

testimony of

He generally utilizes realtors only to locate

potential tenants for his developments, and he normally
determines his own price and terms.
of Lowenberg).

(Tr. pp. SS, S6; testimony

In requesting assistance from Bettilyon Realty,

Lowenberg advised he had some space and, if it had anybody
interested, to come and see him.

He did not sign any real

estate listing agreement with Bettilyon.
of Lowenberg).

(Tr. p. S8; testimony

The only agreement between Lowenberg and

Bettilyon Realty was a letter dated February 21, 1978, prepared
and mailed to Lowenberg by Bettilyon's sales representative,
Gerald F. Daughtrey

(Tr. p. S9; testimony of Lowenberg).

That

letter reads as follows:
Dear Bill:
This letter is to confirm our telephone conversation of
February 17, 1978, registering my client, Fiber Science
Inc., a Division of EDO Corporation of New York, for
you[r] development in the Salt Lake International
Center.

-3Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The commission schedule is 5% of sale orice or 5% of
gross lease.

)

am looking forward to placing a client in your
development.
I

Please execute and return original.
Cordially,
Gerald F. Daughtrey
[Emphasis added]
(Ex. 9-D)
Fiber Science had requested the assistance of Bettilyoo
Realty in locating space in Salt Lake City for its business
operations.

Bettilyon's representative, Gerald Daughtrey,

showed the officers of Fiber Science the Lowenberg property.

In

April of 1978, Edmond Dunahoo, president of Fiber Science, met
in Salt Lake City with Donald Heimark,

(Tr. p. 138; testimony

of Dunahoo) an officer of Cerritos Trucking.
testimony of Heimark).
the Lowenberg property.

(Tr. p. 65;

Fiber Science was interested in leasing
(Tr. p. 140; testimony of Dunahoo).

Heimark was a personal friend of Dunahoo and had been advised by
the latter that Fiber Science was planning on moving its
business operation to Salt Lake City.

Heimark had determined

that Cerritos Trucking might be interested in purchasing the
Lowenberg property for investment purposes.
testimony of Heimark).

(Tr. J?• 66;

Cerritos Trucking determined that it

wished to make an offer to purchase the Lowenberg property with
the intention of subsequently leasing a portion to Fiber
Science.

(Tr. p. 70;

testimony of Dunahoo).

testimony of Heimark; Tr. p. 140;
Daughtrey had presented to Lowenberg a
-4-
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-verbal offer from Fiber Science to lease a portion of the
building at 13 1/2¢ a sq. ft. which offer was rejected by
Lowenberg.

(Tr. pp. 125 and 288; testimony of Daughtrey; Tr. p.

289; testimony of Lowenberg).

Fiber Science did not thereafter

again attempt to lease the building from Lowenberg.
150; testimony of Dunahoo).

(Tr. p.

There were two reasons why Dunahoo

made no further attempts on behalf of Fiber Science to lease the
property from Lowenberg:

first, because Dunahoo was interested

in participating with other Fiber Science officers in the
purchase of the property (Tr. p. 168; testimony of Dunahoo};
second, because Fiber Science needed assurances that it could
expand into additional space in the building if the need arose,
and Dunahoo believed that the additional space would be made
available if the Fiber Science lease was with Cerritos
(Tr.

pp. 169 and 170; testimony of Dunahoo).

Lowenberg had told Daughtrey that he would not guarantee the
availability of additional space in the building.

(Tr. p. 123;

testimony of Daughtrey).
In response to the meeting between Heimark and Dunahoo,
Daughtrey submitted to Lowenberg a written offer for the
purchase of the subject property by Cerritos Trucking Company.
(Tr. pp. 70 and 71; testimony of Heimark; Ex. 3-P).

Thereafter,

a verbal agreement was reached between Mr. Lowenberg and
Cerritos Trucking for the lease of the subject property to
Cerritos Trucking with an option to purchase.

On or about April

28, 1978, Lowenberg and Cerritos Trucking executed the lease and
-5Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Lowenberg executed the option to purchase·

The opt ion agreement

had been prepared by Lowenberg's attorneys at his personal
direction.

(Tr. pp. 223 and 224; testimony of Lowenberg).

On

or about the same date, Cerritos Trucking sublet a portion of
the building to Fiber Science pursuant to written agreement,
(Ex.

10-P).

In about January of 1979, Lowenberg and Daughtrey
learned that neither Dunahoo nor any of the other Fiber Science
officers would be participating with Cerritos Trucking in the
purchase of the property under the option.
273 and 274; testimony of Daughtrey).

(Tr. pp. 211, 213,

Thereafter, Cerritos

Trucking exercised its option to purchase, and Lowenberg refused
to complete conveyance of the property, alleging that he had
granted the option for the purchase of the property

wi~h

the

understanding that the Fiber Science officers would participate
in the purchase and that,

in the absence of that participation,

he no longer was obligated to sell and convey.
With particular reference to the Statement of Facts as
set forth in the appellants' brief, it is therein represented
that Daughtrey told Lowenberg that the Fiber Science group would
own or participate in the ownership of the property.

Mr.

Daughtrey's testimony was that during the meeting in
approximately the middle of 1978,

in which he, Mr. Dunahoo, Mr.

Lowenberg and others were present, Mr. Lowenberg was told either
by himself or Mr. Dunahoo that Fiber Science officers did want
to participate.

(Tr. pp. 127 and 128; testimony of Daughtrey).
-6-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

There was no representation by Daughtrey that the property would
in fact be owned by the Fiber Science group.

The appellant

further represents that Daughtrey negotiated the option between
Lowenberg and Cerritos Trucking.

However, the evidence before

the court was that Daughtrey neither determined the option price
nor the length of the lease (Tr. p. 133; testimony of
Daughtrey).

He was neither involved in making recommendations

to Lowenberg nor negotiating terms, but rather only in relaying
information between Lowenberg and Cerritos Trucking.

(Tr. pp.

117 and 286; testimony of Daughtrey; Tr. pp. 55 and 56;
testimony of Lowenberg).

Although Daughtrey advised Lowenberg

that it was his understanding that the Fiber Science officers
intended to participate in the property, it was at no time
represented by Daughtrey that a lease by Fiber Science was
conditional upon the property being sold to its officers.
pp. 207,

208 and 278; testimony of Daughtrey).

(Tr.

While Mr.

Lowenberg testified that he was unwilling to grant an option to
purchase to anyone other than the officers of Fiber Science,
such alleged intention was never communicated to either Mr.
Daughtrey or the officers of Cerritos Trucking.

(Tr. p. 106;

testimony of Heimark; Tr. p. 275; testimony of Daughtrey).

Mr.

Dunahoo testified that he was not certain he had ever met
Lowenberg.

(Tr. p. 171; testimony of Dunahoo).

It is obvious,

therefore, that Lowenberg had made no such representation to him.
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POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT CAN GRANT A DIRECTED VERDICT IF' THERE IS NIJ
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF APPELLANTS'

CLAI~S

When there is no substantial dispute in the evidence
and when the court can say as a matter of law that reasonable
persons could find only one way on the facts,

then it is the

duty of the court to determine the applicable law and direct the
jury to return a verdict under the law and the facts presented.
Roylance v. Davies, 18 Utah 2d 395, 424 P.2d 142 (1967).
Granting a motion for directed verdict is justified if there is
no substantial basis in the evidence which would support a
verdict for the non-moving party.

Mel Hardman Productions v.

Robinson, 604 P.2d 913 (Utah 1979).
Only if there is some substantial evidence in support
of the essential facts which the defendant Lowenburg is required
to prove in order to entitle him to recover is the question one
of fact for the jury rather than one of law for the court.
Christensen v. Utah Rapid Transit Co., 83 Utah 231,
471 (1933).

27 P.2:l 468,

"Substantial evidence is that which would convince

an unprejudiced, thinking mind of the truth of the fact to whicl
the evidence is directed."

Mood v. Myers, 48 Wash. 2d 476, 296

P.2d 525 (1956).
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POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN GRANTING CROSS-DEFENDANT
3ETTILYON A DIRECTED VERDICT ON APPELLANTS' CLAIM THAT
BETTILYON BREACHED A DUTY OF TRUST AND CONFIDENCE
A.

BETTILYON AND APPELLANT LOWENBERG WERE NOT

IN A FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP

Defendant Lowenberg failed to introduce any substantial
evidence supporting the claim that Bettilyon was in a fiduciary
relation to him.

If a real estate agent is a middleman, no

fiduciary relation to either principal exists.

Barber's Super

Markets, Inc. v. Stryker, 84 N.M. 181, 500 P.2d 1304 (Ct. App.
1972).

The real estate agent is a middleman if employed for the

mere purpose of bringing the possible buyer and seller t0gether
so that they may negotiate their own contract.
at 1311.

Stryker, suora,

The middleman's duties are limited by his contract to

finding and procuring a purchaser able, willing, and ready to
accept the client's terms, or to effect a transaction with his
client on any terms satisfactory to both parties.
Howard, 158 Cal. App. 2d 343, 322 P.2d 1034 (1958).
case, the broker has nothing to do with the trade.
is not needed.
P.2d 533 (1946).

Smith v.
In such a
His advice

Anderson v. Thatcher, 76 Cal. App. 2d 50, 172
The principal does not rely on the broker for

the benefit of his skill or judgment.

Stryker, supra.

The

broker is not entitled to use discretionary authority for the
benefit of his employer.

Smith, supra.
-9-
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Mr. Lowenberg has had substantial experience in the
real estate business.
Lowenberg).

(Tr. pp. 51, 53,

54; testimony oE

He has been a licensed real estate broker in the

State of California for over a 30-year period.
testimony of Lowenberg).

(Tr. p. 52;

Bettilyon an<i Lowenberg did not enter

into any sales agency contract or listing agreement.
58; testimony of Lowenberg).
of real estate agencies,

(Tr. p.

Mr. Lowenberg contacted a number

including Bettilyon, notifying them

that he had space available, and to "bring me a tenant."

(Tr.

p. 59; testimony of Lowenberg).
Mr. Lowenberg did not authorize Daughtrey to negotiate
on his behalf; he simply wanted him to find a potential tenant
at his terms.

(Tr. p. 55; testimony of Lowenberg).

Mr.

Lowenberg is experienced and sophisticated in the real estate
business and did not rely on the advice or skill of Gerald
Daughtrey.

Lowenberg himself set his own price and terms.

p. 56; testimony of Lowenberg).

(Tr.

Mr. Daughtrey was "just an

errand boy passing the information back and forth."

(Tr. P·

117; testimony of Daughtrey).
Mr. Lowenberg introduced no substantial evidence
showing that he vested any discretion in Daughtrey to negotiate
on his behalf or that he counseled with him or placed any
reliance on his advice.
and judgment.

Rather, he relied on his own experience

Therefore, there existed no fiduciary relation

between Bettilyon and Lowenberg.
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B.

EVEN IF BETTILYON WERE IN A FIDUCIARY RELATION TO

LOWENBERG, THERE WAS NO BREACH OF A DUTY OF TRUST AND
CONFIDENCE

Even if Bettilyon were in a fiduciary relation to Mr.
Lowenberg, Bettilyon breached no duty of care.

Lowenberg claims

that Bettilyon breached its fiduciary duty since Daughtrey
failed to lease the property to Fiber Science, as Lowenberg
desired, but,

instead, directed his efforts towards arranging a

purchase of the property.

However, as stated above, it was not

within the scope of Daughtrey's responsibilities to negotiate on
behalf of Lowenberg.

Lowenberg conducted his own negotiations.

Daughtrey's duties were limited to presenting offers, relaying
messages, and obtaining signatures from the parties.
Lowenberg's attorney prepared the option agreement.

(Tr. p. 29;

testimony of Lowenberg).
Lowenberg also claims that Bettilyon breached its
fiduciary duty since Daughtrey had failed to inform Lowenberg
that Fiber Science would have leased the property whether or not
a purchase option was granted to its officers.
however,

is inconsistent with the evidence.

This claim,

Lowenberg was aware

tnat Fiber Science was interested in leasing the property.
Lowenberg testified that Daughtrey had presented to him a verbal
offer from Fiber Science to lease part of the building.
289; testimony of Lowenberg).

(Tr. P·

Lowenberg rejected this offer.

Subsequently, Fiber Science did not extend any further offers to
-11Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Lowenberg to lease the property.

Later Fiber Science leasej

part of the building from Cerritos Associates.

Fiber Science,

in part, did not lease directly from Lowenberg because Lowenbeq
could not guarantee Fiber Science the availability of additional
space it may have needed for future expansion.

(Tr. p. 170;

testimony of Dunahoo; Tr. p. 123; testimony of Daughtrey).

III.

THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN DIRECTING A VERDICT IN FAVOR
OF BETTILYON ON APPELLANTS'
A.

CLAI~

OF MISREPRESENTATION

THERE WAS NO MISREPRESENTATION OF A

PRESE~TLY

EXISTING FACT

The trial court was correct in granting a directed
verdict in favor of Bettilyon since Lowenberg failed to produce
substantial evidence of each of the required elements of fraud:
(1) that a representation was made; (2) concerning a
presently existing material fact; ( 3) which was false:
(4) which the one making the misrepresentation either
(a) knew to be false, or (b) made recklessly knowing he
had insufficient knowledge upon which to base such
representation; (5) for the purpose of inducing the
other party to act upon it; (G) that the other party
acting reasonably and in ignor:ince of its falsity: (7)
did in fact rely upon it; (8) and was thereby induced
to act; (9) to its injury and damage."
Cheever v. Schramm, 577 P.2d 951, 954 (Utah 1978).

Each element

of fraud must be proved by clear and convincing evidence.
Cheever, supra.

Therefore, the directed verdict is incorrect

only if there is substantial evidence to meet Lowenberg's burden
of clear and convincing proof.
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Lowenberg claims that Daughtrey misrepresented that the
option to purchase was for the benefit of the officers of Fiber
Science and that those individuals would own or participate in
the ownership of the property upon exercising the option.

It is

not disputed that Daughtrey did present an offer to Lowenberg
from Cerritos Trucking for a lease and an option to purchase in
which it was intended that the officers of Fiber Science would
participate to some degree in ownership of the building.
Lowenberg's fraud claim is clearly inadequate since no
misrepresentation was made of a presently existing material
fact.

Cheever, supra.

Daughtrey simply presented to Lowenberg

an offer, which he accepted,

for Cerritos Trucking to have a

lease on the property and an option to purchase.

When the

option was set up, Dunahoo and Heimark intended and so advised
Daughtrey that the officers of Fiber Science were to participate
in the ownership of the property.

(Tr. pp. 153 and 158;

testimony of Dunahoo; Tr. pp. 88-90; testimony of Heimark; Tr.
p. 130; testimony of Daughtrey).

Daughtrey relayed this to

Lowenberg.

At the most, this was a representation of

intention.

The only premise upon which that representation can

be actionable as fraud is if, at the time it was made, Daughtrey
actually did not intend that the officers of Fiber Science would
participate in ownership of the property.
~ 18 Utah 2d 134,

Schrow v. Guardstone,

417 P.2d 643, 645(1966).

An expression of

an intention to perform is actionable as fraud only if the
representation of intention was contrary to the actual intention
-13Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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of those making the representation.

Berkeley Bank for

Cooperatives v. Meibos, 607 P.2d 798 (Utah 1980).

Lowenberg

would have to prove that at the time Daughtrey made the
representation that Daughtrey, Dunahoo, and Heimark intended

~e

officers would participate in ownership, they actually did not
so intend.

Thus, Lowenberg would have to prove that Daughtrey

had an actual intent to deceive.

However, absolutely no

evidence was introduced that Daughtrey did not intend at the
time of the execution of the option that the officers of Fiber
Science would not participate in ownership of the property or
that Daughtrey attempted to actually deceive Lowenberg into
believing that the officers would participate in ownership.

B.

APPELLANTS CANNOT MAKE A CLAIM FOR NEGLIGENT

MISREPRESENTATION SINCE

T~IS

CLAIM IS INCONSISTE:CJT Wl7l

THEIR THEORY THAT A MISREPRESENTATION WAS MADE OF A
PRESENTLY EXISTING FACT

As stated above,

for Lowenberg to be successful on a

fraud action he must prove that a misrepresentation was made of
a presently existing fact.

Since the alleged misrepresentation

made in this case was an expression of an intention to perform
in the future, Lowenberg, to be successful on his claim, must
prove that Daug!1trey actually intended to deceive Lowenberg.
Lowenberg would have to prove that Daughtrey actually did not
intend that the officers of Fiber Science would participate in
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-ownership of the property even though he represented that his
intention was that they would participate.
requirement of actual deceit.

This is a

Since Lowenberg must prove actual

deceit by Daughtrey, a claim of a negligent misrepresentation is
not available as a cause of action.

When the alleged

misrepresentation is an expression of an intention, actual
deceit is required for a misrepresentation cause of action.

A

negligent misrepresentation could not fulfill the required
element that there must be misrepresentation of a presently
existing fact.

C.

EVEN IF APPELLANTS DO HAVE A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR

NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION, BETTILYON, AS A MATTER OF
LAW, MADE NO NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION

The elements of negligent misrepresentation must be
proved by clear and convincing evidence.

S?.E.2··

Jardine v. Brunswick

18 Utah 2d 378, 423 P.2d 659 (1967).

Therefore, the

directed verdict is incorrect only if there is substantial
evidence to meet Lowenberg's burden of clear and convincing
proof.
Defendant Lowenberg failed to present substantial
evidence that Daughtrey made a negligent misrepresentation.
Daughtrey presented an offer to Lowenberg in which it was
anticipated that the officers of Fiber Science would participate
in ownership of the property.

The officers had a good faith
-15-
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reasonable basis to believe that they could participate.

The

president of Fiber Science testified:
All right.
Now, you were the president of Fiber
Science at this time, as you've earlier testified.
What made you believe that you could participate in
ownership of the building that was being leased to your
own company?
Q.

A.
My understanding of the corporate policy was if it
were an arms-length deal that it would be satisfactory
to be involved in such an arrangement.
Q.

Did you believe that this was an arms-length deal?

A.

Yes.

Q.

On what basis?

A.
Because we had negotiated the lease with Cerritos
Trucking that was less than was being required for ~e
building originally.
(Tr. pp. 143-144; testimony of Dunahoo).
Daughtrey reasonably and in good faith presented the
offer to Lowenberg.

Lowenberg must prove that Daughtrey

reasonably should have known that the officers of Fiber
did not intend to participate.

Scien~

There was no evidence produced

that the officers of Fiber Science actually did not intend to
participate.

Daughtrey simply presented an offer.

He had no

reason to know or suspect that the officers of Fiber Science
could not participate or did not intend to participate.

He

kn~

nothing of the corporate policy of Fiber Science preventing
officers from participating.

He had no duty to conduct an

investigation to determine the actual intentions of the officers
of Fiber Sciences.

Re has no duty to make a legal determinatioo

of the capacity of officers of a corporation to lease property
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to their own corporation.

He simply informed Lowenberg of a

proposed offer which he can reasonably do without verifying the
capacity of the buyer to perform the offer.
grarantee a buyer's performance.

A broker does not

FMA v. Build, Inc., 17 Utah 2d

80, 404 P.2d 670(1965).

Additionally, Lowenberg negligently failed to protect
his own interest.
In regard to this alleged cause of action for negligent
misrepresentation, it is pertinent to keep in mind that
there is recognized a defense somewhat analogous to
contributory negligence in other tort actions. The one
who complains of being injured by such a false
representation cannot heedlessly accept as true
whatever is told him, but has the duty of exercising
such degree of care to protect his own interests as
would be exercised by an ordinary, reasonable and
prudent person under the circumstances; and if he fails
to do so, is precluded from holding someone else to
account for the consequences of his own neglect.
Jardine v. Brunswick Corp., 18 Utah 2d 378, 423 P.2d 659(1967).
Lowenberg "was no neophyte, but was a man of
considerable business experience."

See Jardine, suora.

Lowenberg failed to inquire whether Fiber Sciences would still
lease the property if he did not extend an option to purchase to
its officers.

This failure to inquire is clearly negligent

since Fiber Science had previously made an offer to lease which
Lowenberg rejected (Tr. p. 289; testimony of Lowenberg), and
Lowenberg, therefore, knew that Fiber Science was interested in
leasing.
Lowenberg's attorney prepared the option.
testimony of Lowenberg).

(Tr. p. 29;

Lowenberg could easily have assured

the participation of ownership of the officers of Fiber Science
~y including in the option a restrictive assignment clause.
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Lowenberg presented no substantial evidence of a
negligent misrepresentation by Daughtrey.

Even if there were,

Lowenberg's own negligence in failing to inquire as to the
possibility of a lease and in failing to direct his e1ttorney to
insert a restrictive assignment in the option would deny him :he
relief he seeks.

CONCLUSION

Appellants failed to present substantial evidence in
support of each element of their claims; therefore, the trial
court was correct in granting respondent Bettilyon a motion for
directed verdict.
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